CONFERENCE REPORT
The European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) and Turkey
A conference organized jointly by the Institute of Turkish Studies and the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) in May at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, D.C. examined the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) and its implications for Turkey.
Following the opening remarks of Murad Dural, Board Member of TUSIAD, four speakers discussed recent developments concerning ESDI. They were: Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff member at RAND’s Washington office; Philippe Errera, Military and Political Counselor at the French Embassy in Washington; Ambassador Onur Öymen, Turkey’s Permanent Representative at NATO; and Walter Andrusyszyn, Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs at the U.S. State Department.
Ambassador Onur Oymen,
“The Turkish Perspective on ESDI”
When discussing new conditions of security in Europe, we should not forget that NATO kept Europe free of military confrontations and wars. Since NATO was so successful in maintaining peace and security in Europe, we should think twice about embarking on new projects that might possibly erode the strength of the Western Alliance.
Therefore, whatever the outcome of the new initiatives, NATO should stay as the most important security organization in Europe and not simply one, among several, important organizations. Our successes in the post-Cold War era in Bosnia and Kosovo owe a great deal to the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO.
During the Cold War, Turkey maintained thirty divisions and made a major contribution to European security. In the post-Cold War era, most of the new sources of tension and conflict have appeared in regions around Turkey. There is a difference between Central European allies and Turkey because we are the Alliance member closest to the regions with serious tensions and conflicts. These present Turkey with real , hard-core security problems.
Most of our allies in NATO profited from peace dividends with the end of the threat to the central front after the Cold War. In 1985, the total defense expenditures of all NATO countries was $584 billion a year. In 1997, this figure was $454 billion. This means that we are spending $100 billion less than what we used to spend during the Cold War. The defense budgets of the member states reflect this change. For instance, the U.S. has reduced its defense spending by about $100 billion; Germany $17 billion; United Kingdom $10 billion; and France, $5 billion.
Turkey is one of the few NATO countries that has not enjoyed the benefit of similar peace dividends because of the rise of new security problems and challenges in its region. On average, the defense expenditures of NATO countries today is less than 2 percent. In some countries, such as Germany and Canada, it is about 1.3 percent of GNP. For Turkey, however, it is over 4.5 percent. That is a very high price but we have to pay it because of our geography and strategic location. When we speak about European security and defense issues, we should remember this fact.
NATO decided to develop European Security and Defense Identity at the June 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council Meeting. Our common decision, which was also reconfirmed at the Washington Summit last year, was that NATO would to play a central role in European security and defense issues.
In discussions about ESDI and ESDP, there are frequent references to various meetings and summits such as Cologne or Helsinki. However, most of the time, one very important reference is overlooked: that is the strategic concept that was accepted by NATO only a year ago. It is more important than communiqués and declarations because that is the basic document.
All NATO allies, whether they are members of the European Union or not, are all committed to NATO’s strategic concept which explicitly states in Article XXX that ESDI should be developed within NATO. Moreover, Article XVII specifically states that non-EU allies of NATO such as Turkey should be involved in all of the operations that might be initiated. This means clearly that they should not somehow be “satisfied” or “pleased”–it means that they should be fully involved. That was our common decision
Therefore, what we expect from our European Union friends is to observe what was agreed by the allies. To our surprise, the EU Summit last year made absolutely no reference to this strategic concept. Contrary to the impressions that some may have, we are not interested in delaying anything regarding European defense and security. What we are saying is that the agreement that was reached in Washington should be fully observed. If our European friends comply with the strategic concept that was agreed on, we will solve existing problems easily.
With so much talk about the EU’s leading role in European security and defense, one might perhaps conclude that NATO is unable to fill this role and that there is a gap that needs to be filled. But this is hardly the case. Fortunately for all of us, NATO has been very successful in European security and defense matters. There is no need to ask the EU to fill a non-existing gap.
The current interest by the EU to add a security and defense role to its existing economic and political functions stems from its desire to play a larger role in international affairs. There seems to be a realization among EU members that without such a security and defense function, the organization probably will never be as important as it should be.
We are not against a larger international role for EU since it is in our interest to join an organization which plays an even more important role than it does today. But we are against arrangements that would give us a second-class status. At present, as a member of NATO, Turkey has full rights in all NATO initiatives and operations concerning European security. We believe that another European security initiative in which we will have less opportunities, less power, and less influence is not a good offer.
We also believe that all NATO countries, and not simply the members of the European Union, should fully participate in the decision-making process in this organization because the decisions on operations led by the EU may have a strong impact on our own security. It is wrong to think that Turkey could play the role of a subcontractor in regional conflicts, involved only in day-to-day operations, where the main decisions will be made by other European allies.
According to the strategic concept of the NATO’s Washington Summit communiqué, the EU will require our consent to use NATO assets and capabilities such as strategic planning, defense planning, satellite communication, transportation, command and control arrangements, and intelligence. These are our common assets and capabilities, and we decided at the last NATO ministerial meeting that we have to decide on each request, on a case-by-case basis, and through consensus. This means that all NATO countries, including Turkey, will have a say while deciding to grant or not to grant a capability or an asset of NATO to the European Union. In talking about the EU’s autonomy, this should not be overlooked. In security matters, we are all dependent on each other
We believe that the question of capabilities is a very important one in European defense and security. In Kosovo, for example, seventy or eighty percent of the troops were American forces. The strategy that was chosen, with its emphasis on sophisticated weapons and satellite-guided missiles, required more American than European troops. In general, all member states should spend more for defense. Some countries, such as Turkey, are allocating much more of their economic resources to defense and security. Defense spending among the Allies should be more balanced because security is indivisible.
We believe that there should not be any dividing lines between the EU member states and those that are candidates for membership. Similarly, we believe that there should not be two or more levels of security among NATO countries in Europe. The European pillar of NATO is not the European Union; it is the European allies, all European allies of NATO, including Turkey, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and Iceland. There are six European countries that are not yet members of the EU and we can not exclude them while talking about the European pillar of NATO.
We hope that some of these problems will be solved through greater cooperation between NATO and European Union. Although we are in the same city and eleven countries are both members of NATO and the European Union, there is no institutional link between these two organizations, except for the informal contacts between our Secretary General Robertson and Mr. Solana.
We are confident that our European Union friends will realize that for us the security of Turkey and the security of Europe are of outmost importance. We may compromise on other issues but we can not compromise on security and we can not accept second-best solutions. Therefore, they should understand that our main concern is a security concern, and that we should find a mutually satisfactory way, as we always do in NATO. They are not going to satisfy us; we are going to satisfy each other. We can not achieve this objective if some are considered second-class countries that need only to be to be “satisfied” without actually involving them fully in the decision-making institutions and processes.
ESDI and Turkey (İng.)
CONFERENCE REPORT
The European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) and Turkey
A conference organized jointly by the Institute of Turkish Studies and the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) in May at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, D.C. examined the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) and its implications for Turkey.
Following the opening remarks of Murad Dural, Board Member of TUSIAD, four speakers discussed recent developments concerning ESDI. They were: Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff member at RAND’s Washington office; Philippe Errera, Military and Political Counselor at the French Embassy in Washington; Ambassador Onur Öymen, Turkey’s Permanent Representative at NATO; and Walter Andrusyszyn, Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs at the U.S. State Department.
Ambassador Onur Oymen,
“The Turkish Perspective on ESDI”
When discussing new conditions of security in Europe, we should not forget that NATO kept Europe free of military confrontations and wars. Since NATO was so successful in maintaining peace and security in Europe, we should think twice about embarking on new projects that might possibly erode the strength of the Western Alliance.
Therefore, whatever the outcome of the new initiatives, NATO should stay as the most important security organization in Europe and not simply one, among several, important organizations. Our successes in the post-Cold War era in Bosnia and Kosovo owe a great deal to the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO.
During the Cold War, Turkey maintained thirty divisions and made a major contribution to European security. In the post-Cold War era, most of the new sources of tension and conflict have appeared in regions around Turkey. There is a difference between Central European allies and Turkey because we are the Alliance member closest to the regions with serious tensions and conflicts. These present Turkey with real , hard-core security problems.
Most of our allies in NATO profited from peace dividends with the end of the threat to the central front after the Cold War. In 1985, the total defense expenditures of all NATO countries was $584 billion a year. In 1997, this figure was $454 billion. This means that we are spending $100 billion less than what we used to spend during the Cold War. The defense budgets of the member states reflect this change. For instance, the U.S. has reduced its defense spending by about $100 billion; Germany $17 billion; United Kingdom $10 billion; and France, $5 billion.
Turkey is one of the few NATO countries that has not enjoyed the benefit of similar peace dividends because of the rise of new security problems and challenges in its region. On average, the defense expenditures of NATO countries today is less than 2 percent. In some countries, such as Germany and Canada, it is about 1.3 percent of GNP. For Turkey, however, it is over 4.5 percent. That is a very high price but we have to pay it because of our geography and strategic location. When we speak about European security and defense issues, we should remember this fact.
NATO decided to develop European Security and Defense Identity at the June 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council Meeting. Our common decision, which was also reconfirmed at the Washington Summit last year, was that NATO would to play a central role in European security and defense issues.
In discussions about ESDI and ESDP, there are frequent references to various meetings and summits such as Cologne or Helsinki. However, most of the time, one very important reference is overlooked: that is the strategic concept that was accepted by NATO only a year ago. It is more important than communiqués and declarations because that is the basic document.
All NATO allies, whether they are members of the European Union or not, are all committed to NATO’s strategic concept which explicitly states in Article XXX that ESDI should be developed within NATO. Moreover, Article XVII specifically states that non-EU allies of NATO such as Turkey should be involved in all of the operations that might be initiated. This means clearly that they should not somehow be “satisfied” or “pleased”–it means that they should be fully involved. That was our common decision
Therefore, what we expect from our European Union friends is to observe what was agreed by the allies. To our surprise, the EU Summit last year made absolutely no reference to this strategic concept. Contrary to the impressions that some may have, we are not interested in delaying anything regarding European defense and security. What we are saying is that the agreement that was reached in Washington should be fully observed. If our European friends comply with the strategic concept that was agreed on, we will solve existing problems easily.
With so much talk about the EU’s leading role in European security and defense, one might perhaps conclude that NATO is unable to fill this role and that there is a gap that needs to be filled. But this is hardly the case. Fortunately for all of us, NATO has been very successful in European security and defense matters. There is no need to ask the EU to fill a non-existing gap.
The current interest by the EU to add a security and defense role to its existing economic and political functions stems from its desire to play a larger role in international affairs. There seems to be a realization among EU members that without such a security and defense function, the organization probably will never be as important as it should be.
We are not against a larger international role for EU since it is in our interest to join an organization which plays an even more important role than it does today. But we are against arrangements that would give us a second-class status. At present, as a member of NATO, Turkey has full rights in all NATO initiatives and operations concerning European security. We believe that another European security initiative in which we will have less opportunities, less power, and less influence is not a good offer.
We also believe that all NATO countries, and not simply the members of the European Union, should fully participate in the decision-making process in this organization because the decisions on operations led by the EU may have a strong impact on our own security. It is wrong to think that Turkey could play the role of a subcontractor in regional conflicts, involved only in day-to-day operations, where the main decisions will be made by other European allies.
According to the strategic concept of the NATO’s Washington Summit communiqué, the EU will require our consent to use NATO assets and capabilities such as strategic planning, defense planning, satellite communication, transportation, command and control arrangements, and intelligence. These are our common assets and capabilities, and we decided at the last NATO ministerial meeting that we have to decide on each request, on a case-by-case basis, and through consensus. This means that all NATO countries, including Turkey, will have a say while deciding to grant or not to grant a capability or an asset of NATO to the European Union. In talking about the EU’s autonomy, this should not be overlooked. In security matters, we are all dependent on each other
We believe that the question of capabilities is a very important one in European defense and security. In Kosovo, for example, seventy or eighty percent of the troops were American forces. The strategy that was chosen, with its emphasis on sophisticated weapons and satellite-guided missiles, required more American than European troops. In general, all member states should spend more for defense. Some countries, such as Turkey, are allocating much more of their economic resources to defense and security. Defense spending among the Allies should be more balanced because security is indivisible.
We believe that there should not be any dividing lines between the EU member states and those that are candidates for membership. Similarly, we believe that there should not be two or more levels of security among NATO countries in Europe. The European pillar of NATO is not the European Union; it is the European allies, all European allies of NATO, including Turkey, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and Iceland. There are six European countries that are not yet members of the EU and we can not exclude them while talking about the European pillar of NATO.
We hope that some of these problems will be solved through greater cooperation between NATO and European Union. Although we are in the same city and eleven countries are both members of NATO and the European Union, there is no institutional link between these two organizations, except for the informal contacts between our Secretary General Robertson and Mr. Solana.
We are confident that our European Union friends will realize that for us the security of Turkey and the security of Europe are of outmost importance. We may compromise on other issues but we can not compromise on security and we can not accept second-best solutions. Therefore, they should understand that our main concern is a security concern, and that we should find a mutually satisfactory way, as we always do in NATO. They are not going to satisfy us; we are going to satisfy each other. We can not achieve this objective if some are considered second-class countries that need only to be to be “satisfied” without actually involving them fully in the decision-making institutions and processes.
Bu belge Konferanslar, Konuşmalar arşivinde bulunmaktadır.