What Sort of NATO Do We Want? (İng.)

CHATHAM HOUSE CONFERENCE
11 APRIL 2002

WHAT SORT OF NATO DO WE WANT?
WHAT DOES NATO NEED TO DO?

I would like to thank the Chatham House for inviting and giving me the opportunity to share my views on the future of NATO and indeed the European security in general. Given the reputable standing of the Chatham House in always capturing the core of the debate in international politics and its ability to make an important intellectual contribution to it by organizing seminars as such, I am particularly delighted to be with you today to discuss a topic, which we in NATO also continue to deal with in light of the upcoming Prague Summit whereby important decisions is expected to be taken.

However, the title of the main session, “What sort of NATO do we want”, somehow conjures up the impression that there is a discontent with this organization’s performance and/or that it needs to fully transform itself in order to stay relevant, as argued nowadays by many in the media. In fact this is not how we see it. We believe that NATO has been extremely successful in providing security and stability to Europe and the wider Euro-Atlantic area for the last fifty years and that it still continues to do so.

Therefore, the question at hand is not the relevance of NATO per se, but the relevance of the international community and the way it approaches to security in light of the drastically changing security environment. In this regard, NATO remains an important and indeed the primary tool in service of the international community to meet the emerging security challenges as well as opportunities. Nevertheless, it certainly needs to be adapted to the new realities and dynamics of the international arena in order to continue to operate effectively.

It is with this attitude of mind and determination we look at the Prague Summit, where the road map for this adaptation will be clearly defined/approved and the necessary processes be launched. Therefore, it would be wrong to see this meeting solely as an enlargement summit, as it would in fact pave the groundwork for all possible new and re-calibrated roles of NATO for the foreseeable future.

In this regard, the fight against terrorism, relations with Russia, enlargement process, refocusing our partnership relations, and adaptation of the Alliance’s capabilities and structures will be the main items and parameters defining our new security agenda.

Since September 11, terrorism has become one of the main parameters defining our security environment. Accordingly, while reflecting on NATO’s new roles and responsibilities we are bound to take this vitally important dynamic into foremost consideration.

In this context, we must harbor no delusions that this scourge will with the passage of time gradually fade away from our political radar screens. Also, we have to understand that we are probably faced with the most dangerous, unpredictable and vicious menace that the humankind has ever seen. Hence, in the new “War on Terror”, the international community and the Alliance members should steel themselves to show as much determination and solidarity as during the heyday of the Cold War.

Then the question is what does NATO need to do in order to rise to the challenge? In fact, our response to September 11 demonstrated that this Alliance is already capable to deal with uncertainty and uncharted territory. Indeed, by taking the historic Article 5 decision on 12 September and in its aftermath, the Alliance has proven itself a flexible instrument adapting even as challenges change dramatically. Furthermore, taking into account that this campaign will not be just military, but one that integrates all the elements of power, the politico-military character of NATO confers upon this Alliance an important comparative advantage. However, that is not an assured success! We have to strive for and deserve it. In this regard, never can be a better time than now to build upon that solid basis and renewed determination in order to establish a sound and concrete security framework, based on not only deterrence and defense but also active prevention.

First and foremost, NATO should review and adapt, as is the case, its conceptual and operational framework, in order to be able to counter effectively an asymmetric threat/attack. Despite the historical Article 5 declarations, there are still gaps and potential for mis-readings of what NATO and the Allies can and should do in the face of such an attack. Therefore, we need to reconfirm and clarify our political will in this regard by agreeing on a firm legal and political understanding on the ways and means to deter, preempt and counter aggression even when it strikes in its most sinister form. We should do so quickly, so that we must not find ourselves in a position whereby we have to look for more “flexible coalitions” in order to ensure our own collective security. In effect, Allies should be able to depend on the Alliance and their fellow Allies, who should then be fully ready for the consequences of their solidarity, including countering retaliatory attacks from terrorists.

On the other hand and more particularly, a political determination to combat all forms of terrorism, irrespective of its source, targets and means should be unequivocally demonstrated. For that matter, we appreciate the position taken by the American Administration right after the 11th of September. In fact, our American friends stressed that the fight against terrorism should be global and that there should be no differentiation among the terrorist organizations. The countries supporting terrorism should be treated no different than the terrorist organizations and there should be no gray areas. As President Bush said, “you are either with us or with the terrorists”.

This is the message Turkey has been trying to convey for more than a decade now. We hoped that all our partners would share this vision. However, I must confess that we were disappointed when we did not see the names of terrorist organizations operating against Turkey in the list of terrorist groups prepared by the EU. It is very difficult to understand that in a list where terrorist groups attacking the interests of Spain, Britain and Greece, as well as those of Middle-Eastern focus were included, the terrorist organizations, which are responsible for the deaths of many innocent Turkish citizens, are excluded. I would like to remind you that the three terrorist organizations that fall in this category have already been banned in some EU countries. Therefore we interpret that the omission of these groups from the EU list is not a view shared by all the EU countries. Such an omission may give wrong signals to these groups and may damage the efforts of international community to combat terrorism worldwide. We hope that the EU will correct this mistake very soon.

Then comes capabilities, given the fact that capabilities without political will to use them have no utility. Nevertheless, in order to deal with surprise and uncertainty in the decades ahead, NATO must definitely improve its capabilities. While many of the capabilities required in the struggle against terrorism may overlap with conventional military means, we should also keep an open mind to developing innovative approaches.
It is true that we need large transport aircraft, precision-guided munitions and secure communications, but we must also examine creating NATO owned and operated collective intelligence assets and giving due consideration to be given to the creation of dedicated operational units on terrorism, including for example a counter-terrorism CJTF. Also, developing NATO capabilities to deal with weapons of mass destruction is of utmost importance, including biological and chemical response units. Last but not least, another important aspect of this new initiative should be to develop a collective civil emergency mechanism.

However, it is unfortunately true that Europe has so far failed to do its share in this department. Our Secretary General has defined it best, “a military pygmy”. Therefore, to ensure these capabilities, NATO and particularly its European Allies should revive the famous Defense Capabilities Initiative so as to bolster alliance-wide military muscle. Why NATO and DCI? Because there is simply no credible alternative forum to do that. Again as our Secretary General said, “only through NATO we can ensure that European defense strengthens our collective capacity, … on which all coalition operations can depend”. That is crucial not only to survive a future war, but also to endure the increasing cries of a widening gap of capabilities between US and its European Allies, in such a way that it starts to threaten the transatlantic solidarity and/or risk emergence of a new American unilateralism.

Turning now to another important topic, the enlargement process also presents a historic opportunity for the Alliance to enhance its contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security. We believe that it is a responsibility, not an option, for NATO to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of these countries, all of which are already full partners. Indeed, a sound enlargement process would serve much wider interests than enlarging the Alliance, with a view to ensuring a coherent perspective on Euro-Atlantic security. This is why we support the “open-door” policy of NATO. Furthermore, the tragic events of 11 September have clearly vindicated the logic behind the enlargement process that security is indeed indivisible. Today, a credible membership perspective and a sound process to guide both sides toward this objective constitute a “sine qua non” for lasting stability.

In this vein, we believe that enlargement, in Prague, towards Southeastern Europe will ensure peace, security and stability in the Balkans, and will add a strategic depth to the Alliance in this part of Europe, where NATO has undertaken indispensable investments throughout the years following the Cold War. This is why we are staunchly supporting the membership of Romania and Bulgaria, an objective shared fully by Greece, Italy, Hungary and the rest of the Southern Region members of NATO.

However, the enlargement process presents an important challenge for NATO as well, not only because of the stakes involved, but also for the practical implications it entails for Alliance structures and working methods. One of the main reasons for the success of our organization is the operational/functional effectiveness displayed by the Alliance throughout the difficult times and its ability to adapt to evolving politico-security situation. Now, particularly at a time when NATO is facing new and more demanding challenges and subsequently taking up new responsibilities, this becomes ever more crucial.

Therefore, we are carefully studying the impact of the enlargement from a functional as well as financial point of view, so as to have the opportunity to reflect on and consequently take the necessary decisions before we decide on the enlargement. In this respect, we filly support the streamlining of our defense planning, military structures as well as political and military decision making processes. However, two key points which underlies the unique nature and ultimately success of the Alliance should be preserved at all cost: These are first the consensus principle of our decision-making process which is an essential tool in ensuring solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance and secondly the fully multinational and representational nature of our Command and Force Structures.

Related to the enlargement dossier, we also need to consider the future of our partnership relations in the wake of the decisions to be taken at the Prague Summit, as enlargement will have a considerable impact on the future development of our Partnership relations. Indeed, after the second round of enlargement the membership profile of the EAPC will change to a large extent, whereby we will probably have more Allies than Partners for the first time.

Therefore, in order to preserve and further develop the dynamism and momentum of the partnership relations, we need to bring further substance,
breadth and depth to the Partnership. In doing so, the basic principles of the Partnership, transparency, self-differentiation and flexibility should continue to be the guiding tenets of the new partnership. We also believe that “issue-oriented” approaches may well serve the different expectations of the partners as well as interests of the Alliance. However, any such approach should be open ended in order to avoid creating new dividing lines. Last but not least, we believe that we need to concentrate more on Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

Here, I would also like to briefly touch upon NATO-Russia relations, which constitutes an extremely important endeavor of the Alliance. In this regard, I should like to underline that NATO as an Alliance has a crucial role to play in integrating Russia into the framework of European security.

Indeed, if NATO can bind Russia closely to the Alliance and to what it stands for, this will be a strategic contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, we should not miss the present window of opportunity in order to translate the momentum gained in the wake of September 11, for the enhancement of existing NATO-Russia cooperation. So far, the negotiations with the Russian side with a view to establishing a new framework of cooperation whereby the “20″ will take common decisions on certain issues on the basis of consensus principle, have shown a rather promising outlook and we aim to conclude the preliminary arrangements by the time of the Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting in mid-May.

However, it is also essential that NATO retain its independent ability to decide and act on important security issues, when necessary. Also, the enhancement of NATO-Russia relations should not be to the detriment of our cooperation with other Partners. Furthermore, we should also harbor no delusions as to the difficulties inherent in this process. Much will depend on the sustainability of the present Russian policies, as well as the degree of cooperation they will be willing to make.

Nevertheless, the path we have embarked upon with Russia is in itself a great achievement in terms of breaking the conceptual limitations of the past and this new relationship certainly holds a big promise for a stronger and undivided European security. Here, I would like to make a simple comparison with that of EU’s relations with third countries in order to better illustrate what NATO is offering to Russia. Indeed, while even NATO allies like Turkey and Norway have not been “granted” the privilege of common
decision-making with the EU, the possibility of integrating Russia into a common decision-making framework with NATO, albeit on certain issues, is a ground-breaking achievement that needs to be well taken note of; if not emulated.

Finally, picking up from this last point, allow me to dwell briefly upon NATO-EU relations. We hope that, by the time of Prague, NATO will be able to strengthen its relations with the EU. Indeed, continued and strengthened cooperation between the two organizations will be one of most strategic assets of the Euro-Atlantic security.

However, I should like to emphasize that this relationship can not be strengthened solely by the will of one side. Accordingly, EU should also show the necessary willingness, transparency and determination for this new relationship. Turkey on this front has adopted a constructive approach and shown the utmost flexibility in order to produce a consensus on both sides. The compromise Ankara text on the participation issue, which is a solid example of our flexibility, constitutes a tangible basis for further progress in the cooperation between the two organizations.

This text now needs to be formalized by the EU and thereafter approved by NATO. We understand that 14 EU members have already given their consent and we are expecting the remaining one to agree as well. Our common understanding while reaching an agreement in Ankara was that this text should not be subject to modification. Therefore, as far as Turkey is concerned, Ankara text is not negotiable. The ball is now in the EU’s court, and we hope that an early solution will be found permitting the creation of a completely new and promising environment for EU- NATO cooperation.

In this context, I should like to underline again that for Turkey, NATO will continue to be the primary security organization of Europe and the wider Euro-atlantic area. In case of future crisis in our continent, NATO should always be the first option. That is to say, EU can intervene and take the leadership of a peacekeeping operation in Europe only when NATO chooses not to do so. We now understand that EU is interested in taking over the operation in Macedonia. Although Turkey is not by definition against such a role for the EU in that country, everyone should realize that in order this to happen, first there should be a demand by the Macedonian Government to this effect, and then a decision by NATO to hand over its mission. Moreover, we have not yet finalized the cooperation arrangements, what we call Berlin+ with the EU, without which the EU would not be able to perform such a peace-keeping operation. These arrangements on the other hand require joint agreement on Ankara text and some other basic principles which will govern future cooperation between NATO and EU. We hope all these issues will be settled in the coming weeks or months so as to pave the way for a new framework of cooperation in the field of security in Europe.

Having concluded my remarks on “what NATO needs to do”, allow me to briefly expound also on what does EU need to do within the framework of European security. In that respect, although some major steps have been taken since St Malo Declaration of President Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair in December 1998 on the establishment of the so-called European army, a lot still needs to be done. At this moment, it is true that there is a political will among EU countries to play a role in the defence and security field or, to put it in a different way, to add a defence and security dimension to the core functions of the Union.

However, to put into practice such a political goal, the EU needs to possess new capabilities. At present the relatively modest level of defence budgets of the EU countries does not allow them to acquire adequate number of advanced weapon systems, transport and communication facilities, command and control systems and sophisticated planning capabilities. In all these fields, the EU in the foreseeable future will apparently need to make use of existing capabilities of NATO. Besides, the sophisticated capabilities should also be accompanied by manpower in terms of robust land, sea and air forces. Within this framework, nobody can overlook the capabilities Turkey could provide to the EU. If compared by other candidate countries, one could observe that Turkey’s potential experience and real capabilities are well ahead not only of the candidates, but practically all EU member countries with the exception of the nuclear powers, Britain and France.

Therefore, I believe that while deciding on the enlargement, the EU should focus, besides the so-called Copenhagen criteria of political and economic nature, also on military capabilities of candidate countries and their possible contribution to the EU in this field. This will not only enable the EU to realize the comparative advantages Turkey could bring in this field to the EU but will also provide Turkey a particular advantage in her way to the membership. Even at this stage, we have pledged one brigade with adequate sea and air components to the EU army, which represents a very high level of contribution, and is much more than what the other ten candidate countries would provide.  After full membership, Turkey’s contributions will be even more.

I can easily increase the list of to-do items for the EU, starting with an advise to refrain from putting too much emphasis on institutional autonomy to the extent that it starts to be divisive and thus detrimental to the overall European security, and ending up with a call to heed more on the vital transatlantic nature of European security. However, I will resist the temptation and will be looking forward to dwell on these issues in the question-answer session if there is further interest.

So, in concluding, allow me to thank you once again for inviting me to such a high-level platform of debate on the way ahead for NATO, which I believe is extremely crucial for the future of European security.