ESDI: Views From Non-EU Allies (İng.)

SPEAKING NOTES
FOR THE MEETING WITH EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS
FROM ALLY AND PARTNER COUNTRIES
ON THE SUBJECT OF
“ESDI: VIEWS FROM NON-EU ALLIES”
29 JANUARY 2001

    I am happy to share with you Turkey’s views regarding the ESDI or the ESDP initiative which dominated the security agenda of Europe and naturally that of NATO, particularly for the last two years.

    In fact it is somewhat unfortunate that we are stranded with such a discussion on the institutional future of European security architecture at a time when we had indeed achieved a great success with and within our Alliance and when therefore we should have rather focused our efforts to increase the effectiveness of this impressive machinery which proved to be most vigorous basis for further improvement.

    On the other hand, despite our historical success, the challenges within the Balkans and elsewhere remain to be utterly difficult and sensitive, and therefore preserving the integrity, cohesion and vitality of our Alliance presents even further significance.

    In this regard even the title of our discussion, “Views from non-EU Allies”, stands as a testimony to the wrong approach being pursued to strengthen the European security, as one of the most crucial factor of our success so far has been our cohesion and unified stance in the face of common threats.

    Indeed, the attempts to exclude or distance some of the main players of the game for the sake of “institutional autonomy” and running into the risk of creating new divisions in Europe will certainly not contribute to European security, but it will rather undermine the very fabric of it by radiating a fragmented picture to those who would like to exploit this opportunity.

    In fact, Turkey in principle has supported the ESDI initiative since its outset. We believed that a stronger Europe, developing concrete assets and capabilities, rather than mere rhetoric, would contribute to the European security by ensuring a more balanced burden-sharing within the supremacy of the North Atlantic Alliance, whereby transatlantic link is of utmost importance.

    That is why we have also wholeheartedly supported the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that has been launched by the Alliance in 1999.

    However, the key points in our approach were and still continue to be the solidification of European security through more cooperation, more collaboration and inclusiveness.

    Furthermore, we should not loose the sight of the end-state we are all (at least supposedly) vying for, which is the consolidation of European security. In that respect we believe that institutional autonomies should not be considered or presented as an end in itself but rather guarded in flexible and constructive manner in order to serve the overall objective.

    This is why we are getting increasingly concerned by the way the European Union is handling its security initiative with such discriminatory and exclusive manner. Indeed, the EU countries, 11 of which are members of our Alliance as well, gradually deviates at each EU Summit starting from Cologne, from the very delicate balance and agreement reached in Washington at 1999.

    Apart from the general considerations that I have just laid out, the developments in this regard are of particular importance to Turkey, as most of the possible crisis areas where ESDP might be put into action would be in the immediate vicinity of Turkey. To put it in other words, what EU plans to do with its Headline Goal will have direct consequences on Turkey’s national security.

    Therefore, Turkey’s concerns are of manifold nature: institutional in terms of preserving the integrity of NATO; substantial in terms of how best to strengthen or even of how not to undermine European security; a matter of principle in terms of respecting and honoring the agreements reached at the level of our Heads of State and Government; and last but not the least national in terms of protecting our national interests and security.

    Against this backdrop, it would be easier to explain what we actually want.

    Foremost, we want to preserve the leading role of NATO as an indispensable organization in the Euro-Atlantic area. This objective has two dimensions.

    First, we should be able to decide firmly and unequivocally on the determining role of NATO in any emerging crisis situation. In that respect, not only the first say should rest with NATO, but also the decision of the Alliance to defer the right to intervene should also be a qualified one. Otherwise, due to the consensus mechanism in NATO, even one Ally, probably an EU member, can easily block a NATO decision on any crisis, paving the way for a premature EU-led intervention.

    Secondly, NATO continues to symbolise the most important and active institutional form of the transatlantic relationship. As the indivisibility of the security of the Euro-Atlantic area still calls for a strong transatlantic link, we should do our best to preserve the vitality of this bondage.

    The way to achieve that goal is to complement the resources and capabilities of our American allies, not creating duplicate and competing institutions. The key point here is to ensure an equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance.

    Another requirement for us is to ensure that all European Allies become full part of this European initiative and be given the opportunity to assume their deserved rights and responsibilities.

    This is not begging for a privileged position. On the contrary, this is a basic requirement for a sound and effective security mechanism. The valuable experience, vast assets and capabilities and finally the vital geo-strategic position of those countries are impossible to neglect and doing so will only undermine the European security.

    To better illustrate this point, suffice me to show you a rough comparison of some basic military indicators of the 15 EU members and the six non-EU European Ally. In almost all cases, the six non-EU European ally has approximately half or at least one third of the overall capacity of the rest of the EU members.

    Another striking example is the fact that Turkey’s declared potential of contribution to the EU Headline Goal stands as the sixth largest contribution in total, surpassing those of the other ten EU members.

    In fact, this offer is also a testament in itself to the fact that Turkey is prepared, in every sense, to assume an important role in this process and to support the EU endeavour for our collective security in Europe.

    So, there is no room for discrimination against non-EU Allies on whatever ground it may be.  Moreover, these countries or at least speaking for my own country, Turkey has clearly demonstrated that it does not aim to abuse or misuse the participation issue for an indirect or short-cut EU membership.

    This has again become most evident when my country has itself confined the scope of the participation issue to those EU-led operations that may take place within its geographic proximity and/or which may affect its national security interests.

    It should be seen only legitimate that we expect to enjoy the same rights and responsibilities as to the preparation, planning, conduct, political control and strategic direction of military operations of that nature.

    However, the EU’s response to that request was most disappointing. What we were offered in Nice were meagre arrangements for so-called cooperation and consultation as well as a rather meaningless “participation” to day-to-day conduct of operations.

    Turkey can not accept this unfair treatment. Therefore, we hope that the EU will soon realise its mistake and will start building upon the Nice framework taking into account our legitimate concerns and views.

    Finally, there should be full transparency between NATO and the EU at every level and the efforts of both organisations in the realm of defence and security must be mutually reinforcing.

    This requirement calls for a comprehensive framework to be established in managing the collaboration and coordination between the two organisations. Joint approaches with respect to all aspects of security, ranging from defence planning to political consultations should be the rule rather than exception.

    I specially emphasized defence planning because it is this particular aspect which eventually guarantees an effective operational posture and a credible deterrence. Therefore at every stage of this important process, be it the preparing the political guidance or identifying the requirements or reviewing the performance, the EU should refrain from unnecessary duplication and must seek a closer coordination with NATO and its well-established mechanisms.

    At this point, I should also underline the significance of the relationship between NATO’S Defence Capabilities Initiative and the EU’s Headline Goal. That these two initiatives should not be conflicting but mutually reinforcing each other is of utmost importance.

    The only way to reach that objective is to engage in non-discriminatory, multi-national cooperative schemes in developing the much needed capabilities.

    Therefore, in order to ensure the coherence and consistency of its efforts with that of NATO’s goals, the EU should pursue an inclusive approach in embarking upon such projects. Accordingly, those planned schemes that is to emerge as a result of the requirements identified for the Headline Goal should be open to everyone and be consistent with DCI.

    Here again, Turkey is ready to actively take part in such endeavours. The fact that Turkey’s implementation rate of  DCI-related force goals is significantly increasing is a testament of our full support to the overall objective of improving European military capabilities.

    In closing, the EU is faced with a great challenge. It is up to them either to follow the path of logic and common sense through cooperation, transparency and inclusiveness, so as to ensure eventually a more secure Europe or to follow the path of greed and selfishness through exclusion, duplication and inefficiency which will eventually weaken and undermine European security.

    It is true that security is politics. But security should never be politicised.

    Unfulfilling the real and hard merits of defence and security can be extremely dangerous, particularly at the present era whereby uncertainty is the dominant characteristics of the security environment that is full of new risks and threats.

    Accordingly, under present circumstances, guaranteed and unconditional NATO support to the EU is not possible, until and unless the Union establishes genuine participation mechanisms that will assure the legitimate security interests of the non-EU European Allies and that will preserve the integrity of the transatlantic link, inherent in the North Atlantic Alliance.

    However, we are ready to continue our discussions in a constructive manner both in the Alliance and with the EU, hoping that our good intentions will be duly understood and reciprocated.